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Abstract
For policies to be legitimate, both the policy process and the underlying reasons must be transparent to the public. In the
EU, the lion’s share of legislation is nowadays negotiated in informal secluded meeting called trilogues. Therefore, presen-
tation of the trilogues compromise by the rapporteur to the European Parliament (EP) plenary is, arguably, one of the few
formal occasions for ‘transparency in process,’ i.e., public access to the details of actual interactions between policymakers.
The aim of this article is thus to examine the extent to which rapporteurs are transparent about trilogue negotiations when
presenting legislative compromises to the EP during plenary sessions, and to assess whether the extent of transparency is
linked to the extent of conflict between legislative actors and to elements of the political context related to rapporteurs.
To this purpose, we coded 176 rapporteur speeches and, on this basis, concluded that these speeches poorly discuss the tri-
logue negotiations. Interinstitutional negotiations are discussed in only 64% of cases, and even when they are, the extent
of information about trilogues is generally small. While we do not find support for an effect of political conflicts, some
characteristics linked with rapporteurs are significantly related to transparency in process of their speeches. This is the
case for their political affiliation and their national culture of transparence.
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1. Introduction
Transparency about the process leading to policy choices
vis-à-vis those they concern is crucial for democratic
representation and decision-making, including in the
EU (Lord, 2013; Stie, 2013). Yet, in the EU, the lion’s
share of legislation is nowadays negotiated in informal
secludedmeetings called trilogues. During trilogues, rep-
resentatives of the co-legislators (i.e., the Council and
the European Parliament [EP]) and the Commission nego-
tiate compromises that are then voted on by their institu-
tions. Since trilogues are secluded, the public is de facto
excluded from the negotiation process leading to EU leg-
islation. It has thus been argued that decision-makers
should at least provide retrospective information on the
process that led to the legislative outcome. This informa-
tion is necessary for citizens to control their represen-
tatives and for MEPs to vote on the compromises with
sufficient information. Therefore, it is the cornerstone of
the accountability of decision-makers to their constituen-
cies, which is a foundation of the legitimacy of the EU
legislative process. This is what Jane Mansbridge (2011)
calls ‘transparency in process,’ i.e., public access to the
details of the decision-making process, as opposed to
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‘transparency in rationale,’ i.e., mere public access to the
reasons for the decision.
In the ordinary legislative procedure of the EU (OLP),
the presentation by rapporteurs (i.e., the main EP nego-
tiators) of trilogue compromises to the EP plenary is,
arguably, one of the few formal occasions for this ‘trans-
parency in process.’ However, although the secrecy of the
trilogues makes those rapporteurs’ presentations partic-
ularly relevant to the accountability of the legislative
process, few scholars have investigated the extent to
which rapporteurs actually discuss the negotiation pro-
cess in plenary. Hence, despite the crucial role of rap-
porteurs’ speeches, we do not know yet the extent to
which rapporteurs are ‘transparent in process’ when they
present the outcomes of trilogues. In this context, this
article contributes to filling this gap by (1) examining the
transparency of rapporteurs’ speeches during plenary
meetings regarding trilogue negotiations, and (2) assess-
ing whether the extent of transparency is linked to the
extent of conflict—i.e., the extent to which actors dis-
agree about the negotiated file—and rapporteurs charac-
teristics. One can indeed argue that the process is more
likely to be transparent in the case of ‘hard negotiation,’
since they havemore concessions to justify. Arguably, the
transparency of the process is also particularly important
when the legislation is highly contested. Indeed, in this
case it is more likely that citizens and other actors in soci-
ety will want to hold those involved in EU policymaking
processes accountable. Similarly, rapporteurs have differ-
ent constraints and experiences according to their politi-
cal groups and member states, and these characteristics
are likely to influence the speeches they make.
Empirically, the analysis is based on an original
dataset consisting of 176 rapporteur speeches. We man-
ually coded each speech to construct a process trans-
parency index assessing the extent to which rapporteurs
discuss the negotiations leading to legislative compro-
mise. We employed this index to evaluate the ‘trans-
parency in process’ of the OLP and test our hypothesis
about the effects of conflict. The remainder of the arti-
cle is structured as follows: The next section addresses
the role of rapporteurs’ speeches for the transparency
of trilogue negotiations, and highlights our contribu-
tions to the literature on the OLP. Section 3 develops
our hypotheses regarding the factors that are likely to
influence the degree of transparency of rapporteurs’
speeches. Section 4 describes our data collection and
the operationalization of our variables, while Section 5
presents our results. Eventually, Section 6 concludes.
2. Rapporteur Speeches and Transparency in Process
Broadly speaking, transparency relates to the availability
of information (Meijer, 2013) and more precisely to “the
extent to which an entity reveals relevant information
about its own decision processes, procedures, function-
ing, and performance” (Grimmelikhuijsen, Porumbescu,
Hong, & Im, 2013). In other words, the transparency of
a decision-making process refers to the extent to which
an actormakes information available about how andwhy
decisions are produced to citizens and political represen-
tatives (Bovens, 2007; Naurin, 2017). A key dimension is
that transparencymust enable the external actors to eval-
uate the process (Warren&Mansbridge, 2013). From this
perspective, Mansbridge distinguishes between whether
the reasons for the outcomes are providedwithout detail-
ing the process behind them (transparency in rationale)
and whether the decision-making process is shared with
the public (transparency in process). Importantly, such
information on the process can either be provided in
real time or in retrospect (i.e., after the process ended;
Naurin, 2017). In the context of EU legislative decision-
making, transparency in rationale would mean explain-
ing why a particular piece of legislation is the best to
solve a particular issue, while transparency in process
would mean legislative institutions explaining how they
arrived at the compromise they adopt. The extent to
which legislative decision-making in the EU fulfils this sec-
ond dimension is disputed, to say the least.
In the period since the early 2000s, legislative nego-
tiations in the EU have undergone increasing informal-
ization. The adoption of EU legislation requires that the
EP and the Council agree on an identical text, which
means that they have to reconcile their respective posi-
tions. Nowadays, most inter-institutional negotiations
in the EU take place in informal meetings called tri-
logues (Laloux, 2020). In trilogues, representatives of the
Council, the EP, and the European Commission negotiate
informal compromises that can then be formally adopted
by the two co-legislators. More precisely, the EP is repre-
sented by a negotiation team led by the rapporteur (i.e.,
the MEP in charge of the file) while the Council is rep-
resented by the rotating presidency (Roederer-Rynning
& Greenwood, 2015). Trilogues are secluded, and the
working documents are not made publicly available:
This means that outsiders, including non-participating
members of the legislative institutions (Brandsma, 2018;
Leino, 2017), cannot observe the negotiations.
Hence, most of the substantive debates occur in non-
transparent trilogue meetings. Outsiders must therefore
rely on trilogue negotiators for information on the pro-
ceedings, that is to say, how the content of EU legisla-
tion has been designed and negotiated. Yet, few stud-
ies have investigated hownegotiators report on trilogues
even though they are the only source of information on
the process leading to compromise. This means that the
‘retrospect’ transparency in process of the OLP in the EP
plenary has not been assessed. Although several schol-
ars have commented on the limited feedback from nego-
tiators, only Brandsma (2018) has empirically studied it.
Focusing on the public reports from EP negotiators to
their committees during the negotiations, he found that
they were generally limited, with negotiators not provid-
ing much information on what went on.
To our knowledge, no study has so far examined how
trilogue negotiations are addressed in plenary meetings
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of the EP. This is surprising since plenaries are consid-
ered as the main institutional arena for public commu-
nication throughout the EU legislative decision-making
process (Lord, 2018; Ripoll Servent, 2018). As stated by
Christopher Lord (2013, p. 1067):
Of all the institutional settings through which [OLPs]
meander, only plenary debates of the EP seem likely
to meet what Anne Elizabeth Stie [2013, p. 75]
defines as a requirement that there should be “at
least one open setting where those decisions are
tested and critically examined by popularly elected
representatives in a manner that is publicly available
and accessible.’’
Whereas debates occur in other places during the EU leg-
islative procedure, such as in the COREPER or the EP com-
mittee, the work in such a forum is often opaque and
there is little public record of the debates therein, in con-
trast to the EP plenary (Lord, 2013; Naurin, 2010). In sum,
the EP plenary is the most appropriate arena for pub-
lic communication about legislative negotiations both
externally, vis-à-vis citizens and national parliament and
internally for MEPs that did not participate in trilogues.
A consequence of trilogues, however, is that plenary
debates in the EPmainly concern issues that have already
been negotiated and compromised on. As a result, the
debates are not likely to havemuch impact on the legisla-
tion ultimately adopted, and rank-and-file MEPs—those
who did not participate in the trilogues—cannot influ-
ence the legislation and therefore do not contribute to
the process leading to it. The only opportunity the pub-
lic has for transparency in the legislative process is thus
in the hands of negotiators and more particularly rap-
porteurs. Rapporteurs do not negotiate alone with the
Council. They are members of larger teams that also
include other MEPs (Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2019).
However, rapporteurs are those in charge of explaining
and presenting the final compromise negotiatedwith the
Council to the EP plenary, and thereby of justifying it in
front of the public, including the course of negotiations
(Garssen, 2016; Stie, 2013). Other members of negotiat-
ing teams can take the floor as well (usually the shadow
rapporteurs) but their time for parole is significantly
shorter (EP, 2019). Moreover, in contrast to the rappor-
teurs who present and justify the compromise, shadow
rapporteurs do not speak as negotiators but express the
opinions of their political groups.
All this means that rapporteurs are the ones in
charge of opening the ‘black box’ of trilogues, not only
to the public but also to their fellow MEPs. In other
words, if we understand trilogues as an informal insti-
tution (Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, 2015) rappor-
teurs’ speeches are one of the only opportunities to
ensure ‘external transparency’ therefrom, that is, trans-
parency vis-à-vis those who are not involved in the nego-
tiations and are therefore notmembers of the institution.
However, there are no institutional constraints on what
they can or cannot share (Garssen, 2016). Rapporteurs
are not compelled to talk about negotiations, which
raises the question of the extent to which they do so and
thereby contribute to transparency in process of negoti-
ation. If, following Mansbridge (2009), one accepts that
transparency in processmatters for the OLP, then rappor-
teurs’ speeches are the key moment for transparency in
such processes.
Yet, how rapporteurs address trilogue negotiations in
plenary meetings remains unknown. Generally speaking,
the literature on plenary debates in the EP has mainly
focused on identifying lines of conflict between MEPs,
but has not addressed the transparency of the decision-
making process itself (Laloux&Pennetreau, 2019). In par-
ticular, this literature largely has overlooked rapporteurs’
speeches, even though they are a potential source of
public information on the trilogues process. The only
exception is the work of Garssen (2016), which aimed
to identify the argumentation scheme at the disposal of
rapporteurs when defending their work, and to assess
the importance of those speeches. While not linked to
trilogues, this work nevertheless showed the relevance
of those speeches. As the following debate consists of
other MEPs positioning themselves against the rappor-
teur’s argument, the types of argumentation that can be
used by proponents and opponents “is for the most part
predetermined by the initial presentation made by the
rapporteur” (Garssen, 2016, p. 26).
Knowing the extent of rapporteurs’ communication
about trilogues is normatively important for two reasons.
First, transparency in process is crucial for public scrutiny
of the legislative procedure. Scrutinymakes it possible to
control EU legislators to hold them accountable (Curtin
& Leino, 2017). However, in order to facilitate the nego-
tiation process, negotiators are often required not to
disseminate working documents, and the various actors
involved prefer not to publicly disclose their positions
(Reh, 2014). In such cases when visibility is lacking in the
process leading to legislation, as in trilogues, accountabil-
ity requires that decision-makers should at least provide
a public account of the process leading to the outcome
(Naurin, 2017; Warren & Mansbridge, 2013). In the OLP,
trilogue negotiation implies that the ‘burden of justifi-
cation,’ or ‘narrative accountability’ (Reh, 2014)—which
arguably falls on the EP plenary—ultimately rests largely
on the shoulders of the rapporteurs. A lack of trans-
parency in the process would deprive citizens, national
parliaments and other MEPs from ‘their right to justifica-
tion’ (Stie, 2013), and thereby hinder them frommonitor-
ing the legislative decision-making process (Laloux, 2020;
Leino, 2017). This could be problematic for the demo-
cratic legitimacy of EU policy-making, which relies inter
alia on public scrutiny of the legislative process, and in
the resulting accountability of EU legislators to their con-
stituents and national parliaments (Lord, 2013). Similarly,
this would also mean that MEPs lack information on
the negotiations, and therefore their votes are not suffi-
ciently informed. They vote on a take-it-or-leave-it basis
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on legislation that has already seen compromise, and
they do so without knowledge of the process leading to
the compromise. This lack of information has the poten-
tial to be problematic since it is the whole assembly—
and not just the trilogue negotiators—that represents
EU citizens and thus that brings collective legitimacy to
the decision.
Second, since rapporteurs’ presentation is important
for the subsequent debates (Garssen, 2016), the extent
to which they are transparent about trilogues might
affect the negotiations process. In other words, if MEPs’
interventions are linked to rapporteurs’ initial speeches,
the extent to which rapporteurs discuss the negotiation
process might affect the extent to which this process
is further debated by the whole plenary. Rapporteurs’
speeches are in this way crucial to the transparency and
legitimacy of the European legislative process; the infor-
mation that they do or do not share influences the way
the EP exercises its powers (Brandsma & Hoppe, 2020).
In practice, this means that rapporteurs advise fellow
MEPs on the need to uphold the EP’s positions vis-à-vis
the Commission and the Council and/or to accept the
position of one or the other of these institutions (Lord,
2018, p. 7). Rapporteurs’ communication about what
takes place in trilogue negotiations not only constitutes
transparency in process vis-à-vis their constituencies and
the larger public, it also constitutes transparency among
peers. The content of such negotiations is also impor-
tant for accountability, which relies not only on trans-
parency but also on the right of a forum to question
the decisions of their representatives (Bovens, 2007).
Therefore, one can argue that transparency about the tri-
logues process is necessary for substantive debate over
legislation, and in turn for the plenary to fulfil its role:
This makes rapporteurs’ speeches a crucial component
of both the transparency and legitimacy of the European
legislative process.
3. The Expected Influence of Conflicts: Political Group
and Nationality
We expect two kinds of variables to have an effect on
the extent to which rapporteurs talk about the negotia-
tion process, the level of conflict of the legislative file and
the background of the rapporteurs. First, the degree of
conflicts is likely to matter because this makes it more
difficult to reach an agreement. By conflict we mean
disagreement between legislative actors as to the con-
tent of the legislative act. The more divergent the posi-
tions of the EP and the Council, the more necessary it
is for trilogue negotiators to make concessions to reach
a compromise (Laloux & Delreux, 2018). Rapporteurs
must therefore account for choices that do not necessar-
ily correspond to the preferences of the EP as a whole,
or of certain political groups in particular. Yet, compro-
mises must be approved by their respective institutions
before they can be formally adopted as a legislative act.
In the EP, a majority in the plenary has to vote for the
compromise, so if a negotiated compromise deviates too
much from the positions defended by the EP, the rap-
porteur is confronted with a risk of defection, including
within her or his own political group. Such a defection
would not bewithout cost to the negotiators. Particularly,
for rapporteurs the failure of an informal compromise
would undermine their reputation, credibility and pres-
tige in their committee as well as within their political
group (Delreux & Laloux, 2018; Mühlböck & Rittberger,
2015). Rapporteurs thus have an incentive to get their
deal accepted, and the more concessions they make
during negotiations, the more precarious their position.
Moreover, deviating too far from the EP position is likely
to entail a reputational cost for the rapporteurs. This
could mean that rapporteurs represented poorly the EP
during the negotiations because he or she was unable to
defend the positions of its principal. As a result, this may
diminish his or her reputation as well as the likelihood
that she or he will be assigned other important tasks.
In such a situation, it is therefore necessary for the
rapporteurs to be clear about the negotiation process
to show that they have done their best. In other words,
the plenary speech may be used by rapporteurs to jus-
tify his or her own actions in the process. One can argue,
then, that it is in rapporteurs’ interests to be clear about
their reasons for deviating from the EP position in the
negotiations process in the event that the compromise is
deemedunsatisfactory if he or shewants it to be adopted.
Indeed, MEPs may be more inclined to vote for a com-
promise they do not fully support if they know the con-
cessions were necessary and the gains hard-won; that is,
if they think the compromise is the best possible deal
for the EP. This supposition is in line with Delreux and
Laloux (2018), who showed that negotiators try to trans-
mit the pressures from the inter-institutional forum to
their institutions to find a deal. Moreover, MEPs arguably
would be more convinced of the justice of a given out-
come, and therefore to vote for it, if they were confident
their side’s position was considered seriously, and this
requires transparency. Hence, our first hypothesis is:
H1: The more conflict there is between institutions,
themore transparent rapporteurs are about a trilogue
negotiation.
We also expect a similar effect of intra-institutional
conflicts, that is to say, when MEPs disagree as to the
content of the file to be adopted. The rationale is similar:
Rapporteurs want to see their compromise adopted,
and will use the negotiations to push for that. Indeed,
refusing a trilogue compromise is also costly for the
institutions, entailing transactional costs and increas-
ing uncertainty regarding the final output (Bressanelli,
Koop, & Reh, 2016; Costa, Dehousse, & Trakalova, 2011).
Therefore, in those cases, rapporteurs are likely to put
more emphasis on the negotiations to show the cost of
rejecting the deal for the EP. Moreover, discussing the
negotiation might also be a means to put pressure on
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other MEPs. The EP might accept the positions of mem-
ber states it does not fully agree with because it wants to
appear ‘responsible’ by not blocking EU legislation, and
because MEPs are sensitive to government pressure via
the national parties (Bressanelli & Chelotti, 2016; Ripoll
Servent, 2013). Therefore, rapporteurs might use negoti-
ations to convince their colleagues that the compromise
reflects thewill of the Council, and that voting for it is the
way to go. Accordingly, our second hypothesis reads:
H2: The more internally divided the EP is, the
more transparent rapporteurs are about a trilogue
negotiation.
Second, besides conflicts, we also expect the elements
of the political context related to rapporteurs to affect
the degree of transparency in process of their speeches
in plenary. Specifically, we expect that the extent to
which rapporteurs are ‘transparent in the process’ will
dependon (1) the size of their political group and (2) their
national culture of transparency. As regards political affil-
iation, we expect rapporteurs from the two larger polit-
ical groups—i.e., EPP and S&D—to be less transparent.
The reason is that, because they have a larger share of
the vote, these groups aremore influential and can there-
fore be more confident that a majority will support their
compromise, so their rapporteurs do not have to work as
hard to persuade their fellowMEPs to support their posi-
tion. This is especially true since those two groups also
tend to form a grand coalition and vote together in the
plenary, thereby reducing further the need to seek the
support of other groups. In contrast, rapporteurs from
smaller group do not have this advantage, and therefore
might be more willing to justify the negotiation process
in order to secure it. Hence our third hypothesis is:
H3: Rapporteurs from the EPP and S&D are less trans-
parent than rapporteurs from smaller groups.
Finally, we also expect one specific national character-
istic of the rapporteurs to influence its culture of trans-
parency and thereby the degree of transparency of
rapporteurs’ speeches: corruption. Indeed, the level of
corruption of the member state might correlate with its
culture of transparency. Transparency is widely regarded
as a crucial tool in the fight against corruption (Tienhaara,
2020). For instance, Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) sug-
gested that increased transparency of institutions helped
to fight corruption under certain conditions. To our
knowledge, the question of whether the opposite effect
is true has not been a topic of focus in EU studies, yet,
arguably more corrupt countries should tend to be less
transparent as amatter of protection for corrupt officials.
Along this line of reasoning, we can similarly assume
that less corrupt entities develop more transparent cul-
tures around conflict and negotiation, which would be
reflected in the way their members account for the nego-
tiation process. Our fourth hypothesis is thus:
H4: The greater the level of corruption in the mem-
ber state where the rapporteur comes from, the less
transparent his or her speeches.
4. Qualitative Analysis of Rapporteurs’ Speeches
The rapporteurs’ speeches were collected in an auto-
mated way using R on the legislative database of the EP.
We selected specifically rapporteurs’ speeches in plenary
sessions, and debating trilogue compromises; due to the
nature of these criteria, all the files in our sample had
been completed at the time of collection. Moreover, we
only selected speeches that were made after the end of
negotiations and therefore preceded final plenary vote;
this explains the total of 176 coded speeches. Since the
speeches were made in different languages, we trans-
lated into English using Google Translate to carry out the
analysis, following on previous work that has shown this
method to provide valid results (de Vries, Schoonvelde,
& Schumacher, 2018).
To assess the transparency of rapporteurs’ speeches
about the trilogue process, we developed a ‘process
transparency index’ based on manually coding speeches.
Since theory is scarce about the transparency of rap-
porteur speeches, we opted for an inductive approach,
which is common in cases when mismatches are
observed between theory and empirical observations
(Timmermans & Tavory, 2012), or when theory is lacking
(Jebb, Parrigon, &Woo, 2017). As is usually the case with
inductive coding, this process took place in three phases
(Charmaz, 2014). During a first investigative phase, both
researchers coded 15 speeches in order to identify the
elements present in rapporteurs’ speeches.
Once the codebook had been inductively established
and its categories stabilized, the same 15 speeches were
coded a second time by the two coders. Through this pro-
cess, 12 different categories were included in the code-
book. Table 1 displays the categories included in the
codebook and Table 2 presents definition and examples
Table 1. Coding categories.
Dynamics of Negotiation (Process) Positions (Input) Claims (Output)




Council and European Commission
Integrated
Dismissed
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Table 2. Codebook.
Code Categories Code Definitions Example of Coded Segments
Negotiations process: hard When rapporteurs refer to the
negotiation process and, in doing so,
assess is as complicated or talk about the
events or (positions of) actors that made
it more complicated.
“We’ve had some tough negotiations
over the last few months, that’s fair to
say, and the text we’re voting on
tomorrow is not perfect.’’
Negotiations process: smooth When rapporteurs refer to the
negotiation process and, in doing so,
assess is as smooth or talk about the
events or (positions of) actors that made
it easier.
“We are here today with a good result
and we owe that to the pleasant and
constructive cooperation.’’
Trilogues When the rapporteurs make explicit
reference to the trilogues and what
happened there.
“With a trilogue agreement on ETS
phase 4 reached in early November,
parliament won a delegated act on the
Corsia MRV rules.’’
Position of the EP When rapporteurs refer to EP
preferences in relation to legislation
and/or the specific positions resulting
therefrom in the trilogue negotiations.
“Parliament also wanted to have better
control on the establishment of the
criteria and the procedure for the
designation of the registry by using
delegated acts.’’
Position of others actors When rapporteurs refer to the Council’s
or the Commission’s preferences in
relation to legislation and/or the specific
positions resulting therefrom in the
trilogue negotiations.
“The Council supported the Commission’s
proposal at 30% in a non-binding
format.’’
Integrated claims: EP When the rapporteurs refer to the EP’s
gains during the trilogue negotiations,
i.e., whether Parliament’s preferences
that were actually incorporated in the
negotiated compromise.
“In parliament, we accepted the structure
as proposed by the commission but
wanted to provide for additional
safeguards, such as for the respect of
users’ privacy and security, consumer
protection and human rights. I am
especially glad that we could strengthen
the text on safeguarding human rights
and the rule of law.’’
Dismissed claims: EP When the rapporteurs refer to the EP’s
concessions during the trilogue
negotiations, i.e., whether Parliament’s
preferences that were not included in
the negotiated compromise.
“We wanted quantified targets, but this
has not been achieved at EU level.’’
Integrated claims: others actors When the rapporteurs refer to the
Council’s or Commission’s gains during
the trilogue negotiations, i.e., whether
Council’s or Commission’s preferences
that were actually incorporated in the
negotiated compromise.
“Just as the council came to meet us with
the wetlands, we had to compromise on
the so-called compensation mechanisms
and the reference value for forests.’’
Dismissed claims: others actors When the rapporteurs refer to the
Council’s or Commission’s concessions
during the trilogue negotiations, i.e.,
whether Council’s or Commission’s
preferences that were not included in
the negotiated compromise.
“The Council agreed to withdraw the
amendments concerning derogations
from the Regulation on the protection of
personal data (GDPR Regulation) aimed
at creating specific derogations for
statistics from this Regulation.’’
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of the coding categories. During the second phase,
another 30 speeches were coded in two rounds of 15.
After each round, a comparison of the coding was con-
ducted,making it possible to refine the coding criteria and
thus ensure better inter-coder reliability. Knowing that our
coding had reached a sufficient level of equivalence that
the results would not be due to chance, we then entered
the third coding phase. Each researcher coded the remain-
ing rapporteur speeches of the sample (and removed
those that did not correspond to the selection criteria).
Of course, induction does not mean a complete lack
of theoretical background (Wacquant, 2002); our opera-
tionalization of transparency in process is based on exist-
ing work on transparency. More precisely, we build our
categories by adapting the work of Brandsma, Curtin,
and Meijer (2008; Brandsma & Schillemans, 2012), who
identify three broad dimensions of the decision-making
process about which decision-makers must be transpar-
ent when accounting for their decision-process: input,
process and output.
First, Brandsma argues that, to hold decision-
makers accountable, principals must be able to com-
pare between outcomes and preferences. This requires
agents to account for the inputs and outputs of nego-
tiations. Information about the initial preferences and
positions of the actors involved is necessary to under-
stand the basis for the negotiation, and therefore to
assess them. This information corresponds to our ‘posi-
tions’ categories, for the EP and other actors. It is indeed
necessary to distinguish between the EP and the other
institutions because the rapporteur is first and foremost
the negotiator of the EP; she or he is therefore primarily
responsible for defending its position against the Council
and the Commission, and wild be judged accordingly by
the MEPs. Arguably, this makes it more important for
rapporteurs to be transparent about the EP’s positions
and outcomes in front of the EP plenary.
Second, information about the outputs of negotia-
tions is also necessary i.e., what happened to the ini-
tial positions. Hence, the question of which institutions’
claims were and were not integrated into the final com-
promise was included among our categories. We make a
second distinction here, which is added to the first one:
It is important to distinguish between integrated and dis-
missed claims. Indeed, it is likely easier for rapporteurs to
talk only about negotiation successes,while transparency
requires talking about the negotiations losses as well.
Eventually, as noted by Brandsma and Schillemans
(2012), information about inputs alone are not in them-
selves sufficient to properly report on negotiations.
Procedural issues (the context and sequence of negoti-
ations) are also crucial in determining whether alterna-
tive outcomes could have been achieved (Behn, 2001).
This means including practical information about the
process—trilogues and their dynamics in our case—
which is to say, whether the rapporteur could have
achieved a different outcome. Table 1 displays the cod-
ing strategy and our resulting category.
This coding enabled us to build an index of the trans-
parency of rapporteurs’ speeches. The index is com-
posed of the following seven categories: (1) negotiations
process (which combines hard and smooth processes
and a specific trilogue category), (2) position of the EP,
(3) position of others actors, (4) integrated claims—EP,
(5) dismissed claims—EP, (6) integrated claims—others,
and (7) dismissed claims—others. These categories cover
the three dimensions necessary for citizens and MEPs to
evaluate the results of the negotiators: Firstly, the posi-
tions of the actors and what happened in the compro-
mise, but also practical information on the conduct of
the negotiations, so that the EP can assesswhether other
results could have been achieved. All the categories are
presented in detail, including examples in Table 2. On
this basis, the process transparency score of each speech
is the sum of the categories that compose it: one point
for each category. This process transparency score is the
dependent variable of our analyses.
Regarding the independent variables, following Cross
andHermansson (2018), wemeasured inter-institutional
conflicts by the length of the negotiations. Our assump-
tion is that, in more conflictual cases, more time is
needed to reconcile the positions of the actors. We used
the result of the vote in the EP to measure the extent
of intra-institutional conflicts. For our third hypothesis,
we used a dummy variable taking the value of ‘1’ for EPP
and S&D rapporteurs, and ‘0’ for the rapporteurs of the
other groups. We measure corruption using the latest
report of the Corruption Perceptions Index provided by
Transparency International. This index measures the per-
ceived levels of corruption in the public sector of world-
wide countries. Scores ranged from 0 (highly corrupt) to
100 (very clean).
Two control variables were included in the model.
First, we controlled for the number of words in the
speeches, since we assume that the more rapporteurs
speak, the more likely they are to address the negotia-
tions.We also control for the scope of a file, measured by
the number of Eurovoc descriptors (Van Ballaert, 2017),
as it is likely that rapporteurs have to spend more time
describing files dealing with many subjects, thus leaving
less time to discuss the negotiations in their speeches.
5. Modestly Transparent Speeches, Regardless
of Conflicts
In this analytical section, we firstly present a descrip-
tion of our coding results. Then, we explore the data
descriptively by examining variation according to the
characteristics of the rapporteurs and of the committee.
Eventually we test our hypotheses using negative bino-
mial regressions.
Figure 1 displays the distribution of the process trans-
parency index, aswell as the occurrence of each category.
First, looking at the distribution of the process trans-
parency index of the speeches, a first lesson is that it is
left skewed. More than 35% of the rapporteur speeches






















Figure 1. Distribution of the categories and process transparency scores.
do not mention any of our categories relating to the tri-
logue negotiations (64 out of the 176 speeches), while
fewer than 10% of the rapporteurs in our sample men-
tioned five or six of the categories (respectively nine and
six speeches). Another lesson from this observation is
that no single speech within the sample discusses all
seven categories. Hence, we can conclude that rappor-
teurs’ speeches presenting compromises reached in tri-
logues are modestly transparent regarding the process
that led to them. Of course, some of the informationmay
flow informally from the rapporteur to the parliamen-
tary committee and, via the latter, is disseminatedwithin
the political groups. Nevertheless, rapporteurs’ speeches
during plenary sessions, as provided for in the formal-
ized institutional procedure, do not guarantee access
to information on these negotiations. In other words,
rapporteurs’ speeches are not sufficient to ensure that
MEPs are informed about the negotiations process when
they vote.
Figure 1 also shows that, when talking about the
negotiations, rapporteurs focus more often on the EP
(successes), and on describing how negotiations as such
generally went. That is to say, they mainly refer to
the EP’s position during trilogue negotiations with the
Council and the Commission (a bit over 30%of speeches),
as well as the course of the negotiation process: hard
or smooth (a bit over 30% of speeches). In a quarter of
the speeches in the sample, the bargaining successes of
the EP (integrated claims) is mentioned. Trilogue negoti-
ations are discussed in 20% of the speeches. The only cat-
egory relating to the actors involved in the negotiations
that is regularly mentioned is the bargaining position of
other actors (32 speeches, i.e., 18% of cases). In con-
trast, rapporteurs rarely mention the concessions made
by other actors or their success in the negotiations. The
demands of other actors that ended up being dismissed
in the final compromise are addressed in under 4% of
the speeches (six speeches). Similarly, the demands of
other actors that were integrated into the compromise
are addressed in slightly under 8%of cases (14 speeches).
Noteworthy is that rapporteurs do not often talk about
the EP’s failures during negotiations either—or at least
much less than about its successes. The EP’s dismissed
claims are mentioned in 19 discourses (a bit under 11%
of cases).
We turn now to examine the variation in the pro-
cess transparency index according to the characteristics
of the speaker. First, the functioning of the EP is orga-
nized around groups. Therefore, one of the questions
that arises is whether the degree of transparency of the
rapporteurs’ speeches varies according to their political
affiliation. As can be seen in Figure 2, the average trans-
parency of rapporteurs’ speeches according to the differ-
ent political groups is relatively low but varies by twice.
The least transparent group is the EFDD, with an aver-
age of 1 on the process transparency index. It is notewor-
thy that the two main groups in the EP—the Christian
Democrats and the Social Democrats—are respectively
in the penultimate and antepenultimate positions, with
average scores below 1.5. This is in line with our expecta-
tion that rapporteurs from those groups have less need
to be transparent. The Greens have an average trans-
parency score above 1.5, just behind the ECR—the third
most transparent group, with a score close to 2. Finally,
with a score between 2 and 2.5, the Liberals have the
second-best average transparency score, just behind the


































Mean Process Transparency Score
Figure 2.Mean process transparency score per political group and nationality.
left-wing group, which is close to 2.5 on average on the
process transparency index.
Second, beyond the political groups, another crucial
dimension of the EP, like other parliaments, is the terri-
torial dimension, i.e., the member states as far as MEPs
are concerned. Figure 2 also displays the mean process
transparency score per country. With an average trans-
parency score of 3.5, Danish MEPs are the most trans-
parent, and are an outlier compared to their peers. They
are followed, at a good distance, by the British MEPs—
2.5 on average on the transparency index. Next, come
17 Member States whose rapporteurs’ speeches range
from an average of 2 to 1. Italian rapporteurs are, on
average, just below 1, followed by Portuguese, Maltese
and Latvian rapporteurs. Finally, the only Slovakian rap-
porteur of our sample did not provide any information
on the trilogues in his speech, and therefore scores 0 on
the process transparency index. Hence, there seems to
be a slight tendency for the rapporteurs from the coun-
tries that joined the EU earlier to producemore transpar-
ent speeches. Nevertheless, this tendency is mitigated
by the position of Italy as well as, to a lesser extent,
the Netherlands (and also by the rapporteurs from Spain
and Portugal, if only the CEECs are considered as new
Member States).
We also examined variation in the process trans-
parency index according to the public policy areas of the
file, as reflected in the structure of parliamentary com-
mittees (see Figure 3). Since the EP committees have
different working habits and are concerned with pol-
icy domains at varying levels of politicization (Laloux
& Pennetreau, 2019), it is possible that their internal
functioning affects the transparency of their rapporteurs’
speeches. Again, the average transparency per parlia-
mentary committee varies but remains generally low.
Speeches by rapporteurs from the committee on agri-
culture are the most transparent, with a score around
2.5. Next comes a group of six committees with a score
between 2 and 1.5. This first group shows that the impor-
tance of EU competencies does not seem to influence
the degree of transparency of rapporteurs according to
their parliamentary committees. Indeed, the committee
dealing with industrial research and energy issues—an
area in which the EU has only limited competence—falls
between those relating to agriculture and the internal
market, areas in which the EU has extensive competence.
A second group of nine committees has speecheswith an
average score between 1.5 and 1, confirming our obser-
vation. Finally, the few speeches made by rapporteurs
from the committees on Constitutional Affairs and on
Budgetary Control are not transparent at all, with a score
below 0.5.
To test our hypotheses, we conducted regression
analyses using the score of our process transparency
index as the dependent variable. Specifically, since
this score is basically a count variable, we conducted
event count models, here negative binomial regressions.
Table 3 shows that none of our hypotheses regarding con-
flicts can be supported. Neither of our measures of con-
flict has a statistically significant effect on transparency.
Therefore, we find no support for our assumptions that
rapporteurs are more transparent in the most conflict-
ual cases, for neither intra nor interinstitutional conflicts.
This result may be explained by the fact that the counter-
vailing dynamic is also going on in some cases. One could
aswell argue that the greater the conflict, the less likely a



















0 1 2 3 4
Mean Transparency Score
Figure 3.Mean process transparency score per EP committee.
rapporteur would be to go into it in public. Indeed, show-
ing that they have made many concessions could isolate
them and put them in a difficult situation in the EP, which
would perhaps even cost them votes. If the two hypothe-
ses work concurrently, this would explain the results
obtained, i.e., the absence of a meaningful relationship.
In contrast, the hypotheses regarding rapporteur
characteristics tell a different story. As we expected, rap-
porteurs from large member groups tend to be signif-
icantly less transparent than those from smaller ones.
This supports our hypothesis that they have less need to
be transparent since they also have less need to partner
with other groups. Similarly, there is a significant nega-
tive relationship between corruption and transparency.
In other words, rapporteurs frommore corrupt countries
tend to be less transparent about trilogues. This result
could imply that, as we expected, the (dys)functioning of
politico-administrative systems influences the culture of
transparency and negotiation at the EU level. However,
justmaking information availablewill not prevent corrup-
tion if such conditions for publicity and accountability as
education, media circulation, and free and fair elections
are weak.Many studies have shown thatmultiple factors
interact (Camaj, 2013; Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010), more-
over, policy instruments deployed to promote trans-
parency or fight corruption may have little impact on
the perception of these phenomena (Dunlop, Kamkhaji,
Radaelli, Taffoni, & Wagemann, 2020). A focus on this
specific issue of the relationship between member state
corruption and the degree of transparency of the incom-
ing rapporteurs’ discourse is therefore necessary to bet-
ter understand what is going on.
Regarding the control variables, only the number of
words has a statistically significant impact on the degree
Table 3. Results of the negative binomial regression.
Without Control With Controls
Duration of the procedure (in days/10) 0.003 (0.000) 0.003 (0.000)
% Vote in Plenary 0.3 (0.8) 0.6 (0.8)
Rapporteur of large political group −0.4** (0.2) −0.4** (0.2)
Corruption 0.01** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01)
N# of Eurovoc descriptors −0.1 (0.05)
N# of words in the speech 0.002*** (0.001)
Constant 0.1 (0.6) −0.5 (0.8)
Observations 176 176
Log Likelihood 283.8 274.5
Akaike Inf. Crit. 575.6 561.0
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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of transparency of rapporteurs’ speeches. Logically, the
more a rapporteur speaks, the more likely it is that he
or she will mention something related to the negotia-
tions. This also means that we found no evidence that
among rapporteurs the scope of a dossier reduces the
extent of transparency. As a robustness check, we also
conducted OLS and negative binomial regressions, with
similar results.
To explore our data, we also conducted a probit
regression for all the categories of our index. Whereas
the majority did not differ from the main model, inter-
estingly, the length of the procedure was significantly
linked to how rapporteurs describe the negotiations.
Specifically, the longer a procedure is, the more rappor-
teurs use the ‘hard process’ category and, conversely,
rapporteurs use more the ‘smooth process’ category for
shorter procedures. This suggests that, at least, rappor-
teurs report properly to the plenary about the difficulty
of the negotiations.
6. Conclusion
The aim of this article has been to examine and explain
the extent to which EP rapporteurs are transparent
about trilogue negotiations when presenting legislative
compromise to the EP plenary. To do so, we assessed the
effect of legislative conflicts and rapporteurs’ character-
istics on this transparency in process. We coded 176 leg-
islative speeches and, on this basis, came to the conclu-
sion that ‘transparency in process’ is rather poor during
EP plenaries. The inter-institutional negotiations are dis-
cussed in only 64% of the cases and, when so, the extent
of information about them is generally little. In other
words, rapporteurs’ speeches do not guarantee that
MEPs have sufficient information about the negotiation
process when they vote on the compromise. This result
may be due to organizational constraints on the conduct
of the plenary sessions, leaving little time for the rappor-
teurs. Rapporteurs have to find a balance between infor-
mation on the legislative provisions, and information on
the negotiation process itself. Our results indicate that
this balance leans towards the former. Another result is
that rapporteurs tend to focusmore on the EP’s positions
and outcomes than on those of the other institutions.
This suggest that they knowingly act as agents of the EP
when discussing negotiations.
Regarding the factors explaining transparency in pro-
cess in the plenary, contrary to our expectation, we
do not find a significant link between legislative con-
flicts and transparency in process. However, the hypoth-
esis that transparency in process is linked to the indi-
vidual characteristics of the rapporteurs is supported.
We observe that EPP and S&D rapporteurs are signif-
icantly less transparent, which may explain the gen-
eral findings about low transparency. It might also be
a problem since, as these two groups are the largest
in the EP and often come together in a grand coalition,
many (important) files are dealt with by their members.
Another important finding is that corruption reduces
transparency. The higher the level of corruption in a
member state, the lower the transparency of speeches
made by rapporteurs from that country.
From a normative point of view, these are not good
results. The legitimacy of EU policymaking is partly
based on public scrutiny of the process, which is why
trilogues have been criticized for their lack of trans-
parency in process. While this concern could be partially
allayed by rapporteurs’ public reporting on the negoti-
ations, we did not find evidence that this was the case.
Rapporteurs’ speeches during EP plenaries do not seem
to provide enough information on trilogue negotiations
for outsiders to be able to assess how negotiations went.
What is more, we did not find evidence that more con-
flicts result in more transparency, whereas one could
argue that the trilogue concessions that conflicts induce
require more justification. Hence, these results cast fur-
ther doubt on the extent to which plenary debates in the
EP are able to fulfil their role in providing justification for
EU legislation and therefore to legitimize the EU legisla-
tive process.
We conclude by stressing that these results beg fur-
ther research on the transparency of trilogues. So far,
existing studies have mainly focused on the availability
of working documents, and less on the actual reporting
of negotiations by their participants. Potential avenues
for future research include consideration of the longitu-
dinal perspective. Going back to the early days of trilogue
negotiations would make it possible to observe whether
their gradual institutionalization and the importance
they have garnered with respect to OLPs have influenced
the way rapporteurs report on them. Similarly, a deep-
ening of the analysis through political affiliation could
yield other results. Indeed, the political groups in the
EP are not always coherent or homogeneous. Analyzing
the transparency of speeches based on national political
party affiliation might lead to different results. It could
also be interesting to test some individual variables, such
as the political seniority, former professions, level of edu-
cation, and even the age or gender of rapporteurs.
Further, the fact that rapporteurs do not speak much
about trilogue negotiations in the plenary raises the ques-
tion of what they talk about when they justify legislative
compromise. Further studies could investigate rappor-
teurs’ speechesmore generally, not only through the lens
of transparency in process, which would enable assess-
ment of how legislations are justified in the EU. More
particularly, examining the transparency in rationale of
rapporteurs’ speeches would make it possible to assess
whether this compensates for the lack of transparency in
process, and thereby to assess the transparency of rap-
porteurs’ speeches as awhole. Finally, scholars could also
investigate the quality of account given in the other insti-
tutions participating in trilogues. Such research would
improve our understanding of how policy choices are jus-
tified in the EU, and thereby make it possible to better
assess the democratic legitimacy of such policies.
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